March 6, 2010
“There is little doubt… that Nietzsche means his project to be as much a phenomenology as a genealogy, and that he recognizes the methodological and self-referential problems generated by a naive faith on a “scientific genealogy.” - from Pippen’s paper in the cambridge companion to friend N.
If Hume is the first phenomenological thinker, then Nietzsche is without a doubt the second. I have long been aware of the similarities between Nietzsche and Husserl, but even if we grant Nietzsche’s phenomenology of knowledge, i.e. “admit the lie of the concept” to use Nancy’s words, we are still left with the task of interpreting this knowledge and our relationship towards it. Perhaps another way to put it is, that we are still left with the task of determining the value of knowledge - “and with that we stand on moral ground.”
“Thus the question ‘Why science?’ leads back to the moral problem: Why morality at all, if life, nature and history are ‘immoral’?” - GS §344

“There is little doubt… that Nietzsche means his project to be as much a phenomenology as a genealogy, and that he recognizes the methodological and self-referential problems generated by a naive faith on a “scientific genealogy.” - from Pippen’s paper in the cambridge companion to friend N.

If Hume is the first phenomenological thinker, then Nietzsche is without a doubt the second. I have long been aware of the similarities between Nietzsche and Husserl, but even if we grant Nietzsche’s phenomenology of knowledge, i.e. “admit the lie of the concept” to use Nancy’s words, we are still left with the task of interpreting this knowledge and our relationship towards it. Perhaps another way to put it is, that we are still left with the task of determining the value of knowledge - “and with that we stand on moral ground.”

“Thus the question ‘Why science?’ leads back to the moral problem: Why morality at all, if life, nature and history are ‘immoral’?” - GS §344

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